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EMS = Emergency Medical Services; FDNY = Fire Department of New York; ICS = Incident Command System.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/5/6/301
A mass casualty incident in New York City is defined as any
incident that produces five or more patients with the potential
need for extraordinary resources [1]. Managing a mass
casualty incident begins with notifying local emergency
response agencies. Whichever agency arrives first sizes up
the situation and provides a preliminary situation report. This
forms the basis of an Incident Command System (ICS). The
accuracy of the ICS plan is crucial to the successful
command and control of an incident. This discussion will
outline the mass casualty incident response and the ICS plan
of the World Trade Center attack through the personal expe-
riences of the author. This article is purely from the perspec-
tive of a paramedic ‘on the ground’ and should not be
construed as official views or policy of the City of New York
Fire Department.
Incident management system and START
triage
All incidents have an Incident Commander. The World Trade
Center attack was primarily an aircraft crash, so the Incident
Commander came from the Fire Department of New York
(FDNY). As part of the ICS plan, the Incident Commander
breaks down the operation into task-specific branches. The
tasks include communications, logistics, setting up a morgue,
safety, transportation, triage, and treatment. The idea is that
each branch operates dynamically and can expand or con-
tract as the situation escalates or de-escalates.
In New York City, mass casualty triage is accomplished
through the START system — Simple Triage and Rapid Treat-
ment [2]. This method is designed to allow advanced Life
Support Paramedics and Basic Life Support Emergency
Medical Technicians to triage patients in 60 s or less using
three observations: respiration, circulation and mental status.
The goal is to identify the most life threatening problem, to
correct it, to assign the patient a priority, and to move on. The
patients’ priority is indicated by a color-coded triage card that
is tagged to them and holds the most basic information. New
York City uses the METTAG© triage card [3], which uses
color to identify patient status: black for deceased, red for
when immediate attention is needed, yellow for when atten-
tion can be delayed, and green for minor injuries. After triage,
those with green tags are encouraged to assist the more
severely injured (called ‘buddy aid’), which helps to maximize
the amount of care one paramedic can provide.
11 September 2001
When the FDNY heard an aircraft had struck the World Trade
Center, my Chief and I assumed it was a small observation
plane or a light aircraft that had left its authorized air corridor.
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That was until we turned on the local 24 hour television news
station. It took less than 30 min to travel from the Bronx to
lower Manhattan, despite it being the morning rush hour. The
New York Police Department had done a magnificent job of
clearing major roads and thoroughfares.
On arrival we received orders from the Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) Major Response Duty Chief to take over
medical operations inside 1 World Trade Center. Inside 1
World Trade Center, the tower that had just been hit, a
command station had already been set up and was staffed by
the FDNY, the New York Police Department, and the Port
Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey.
My Chief and myself were asked to organize a safe and, if
possible, covered way out for self-evacuating civilians and to
create a triage area on a floor in 1 World Trade Center below
the fire. Before much could be achieved, however, the
second aircraft hit Tower 2 and, as we all know, Tower 2
soon collapsed.
The collapse of Tower 2 caused havoc for the command and
control structure, overloaded the operations’ radio frequen-
cies, and resulted in immense loss of life among the emer-
gency teams. It was difficult to adapt operations to the new
demands; a difficulty that increased exponentially when
Tower 1 collapsed. However, we rapidly re-established a
temporary medical command post at one of the adjacent
undamaged hotels and the operation was once again broken
down into task-specific branches. This was a monumental
task given the psychological impact of the event, the damage
to local telephone services, and what can only be described
as the ‘fog of war’ view at the site.
After the collapses
The EMS operations resumed literally before the dust settled.
Triage and treatment teams entered the collapse zone to
begin what would be a Herculean effort. To relieve the down-
town hospitals from the influx of patients, two Casualty
Collection Points were created to treat the throngs of self-
evacuating civilians from Lower Manhattan: to the north,
Chelsea Recreational Piers; and to the east, Staten Island
Ferry terminal. These two Casualty Collection Points also
enabled better command and control, better patient tracking,
and provided improved safety for EMS responders and civil-
ians. Within the collapse zone, patients were being trans-
ported across long and rough distances because of the dust
and debris. To assist the on-scene personnel, the EMS
deployed its fleet of all-terrain vehicles, which became the
workhorse of the operation, running 24 hours a day.
By this time we were receiving assistance from EMS units in
the surrounding New York counties and New Jersey. At first,
we had problems communicating with one another and track-
ing patients, but this was quickly overcome once we acquired
compatible radio equipment and standardized our tracking
mechanisms.
My chief and myself were given the task of setting up the
Staten Island Ferry Casualty Collection Point. While working
around the tip of lower Manhattan, we saw a flotilla of every
conceivable craft rushing into port, standing against any sea
wall space they could find, in an attempt to help civilians
(injured to varying degrees) get away from the dust and
debris covering Manhattan. We set up an aide station inside
the ferry terminal capable of treating upwards of 100 casual-
ties up to the level of advanced life support. We were joined
by Emergency Medical Technicians and reinforced by off-duty
paramedics, all prepared to receive and treat the crush
injuries, dust impacted airways, and burns. However, the
volume of casualties was unexpectedly light. After the first 24
hours of the operation, no further survivors where recovered
from the collapse zone or void spaces.
Problems created by good intentions
Early on in the incident, we saw many well-intentioned
medical professionals involving themselves in situations for
which they where unprepared, untrained, and unequipped.
Several lone physicians, dressed in scrubs and running
shoes, where found in the collapse zone providing medical
intervention to potentially trapped victims. In some cases,
impromptu medical clinics had been established. Once iden-
tified, these physicians were politely but firmly escorted out of
the area because they created problems, such as medical
oversight and accountability, liability, patient tracking, and
safety to name but a few. Part of the FDNY EMS response is
to call up ‘Response Physicians’, medical practitioners
trained and authorized to work in such conditions.
As if the traveling medical shows were not enough, in the col-
lapse zone, in heavily damaged buildings and covered in dust,
well-intentioned people offered food to the rescuers. However,
given the disruption to water and gas, the lack of hand-
washing, unrefrigerated food, poorly cooked food, and dust-
contaminated food all presented the potential to cause illness
among the already worn-down rescuers. Public health officials
and the police eventually eliminated these ‘chow lines’, and a
more organized system of mass feeding was organized.
Conclusion
Clearly the World Trade Center attack opens a new and
frightening chapter in history. The unprecedented use of com-
mercial airliners as weapons of mass effect outlines the need
for all public safety response agencies to seriously review
and perhaps even modify their response and operational doc-
trine in dealing with terrorist attacks.
LC is the Advanced Life Support Coordinator and a hazardous materi-
als technician of the EMS Division Two of the FDNY. He has 15 years’
experience of the New York City EMS system. EMS Division Two is
located at Jacobi Hospital in North Bronx, New York. The opinions
expressed here are those of LC and do not necessarily reflect those of
the FDNY EMS.
The Emergency Medical Service Command Memorial Foundation
accepts donations to benefit the widows and children of the members
of the FDNY EMS Command who made the supreme sacrifice in ther
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line of duty. Donations can be sent to: The EMS Memorial Foundation,
P.O. Box 2650, New York, NY 10108, USA.
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